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Why Our Separation of Powers
Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal
E. Donald Elliott*
"The fault ... is not in our stars,
But in ourselves . .. ."
-William Shakespeare'
"[It has] always been the way of multitudes to interpret their own
symbols literally .... "
-Joseph Campbell2
Separation of powers jurisprudence in the United States is in an
abysmal state. That conclusion emerges clearly from virtually every
article in this symposium.
The kindest thing that anyone seems to be able to say about re-
cent separation of powers decisions is that in certain cases the
Supreme Court happened to reach the right result, albeit for the
wrong reasons. 3 Some commentators, while critical of the Court's
reasoning (or lack thereof), appear to take great comfort from their
ability to write "alternative opinions" in which they supply reasoned
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I would like to thank Owen Fiss, Bruce
Ackerman, Tom Grey, Geoff Miller, Cass Sunstein, and Peter Strauss for their insightful
comments on an earlier draft. I am, of course, responsible for the errors that remain.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Fourth Annual O'Neill Symposium
on American Politics at Boston College.
1. W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR 35 (S. Johnson ed. 1954).
2. J. CAMPBELL, MYTHS TO LIVE By 9 (Bantam ed. 1973).
3. See, e.g., Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-
A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488, 488-89 (1987) (arguing that the Court
reached "defensible results" in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), and Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), but via "inconsistent
reasoning").
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rationales for the Court's results. In my opinion, this draws just the
wrong lesson. Far from being a hopeful sign, it is a damning com-
mentary on the abysmal state of our current separation of powers
jurisprudence that any reasonably competent law professor can sup-
ply better opinions than the justices of the Supreme Court in sepa-
ration of powers cases.
Our separation of powers jurisprudence is abysmal because the
Supreme Court has failed for over two hundred years of our history
to develop a law of separation of powers. The Court has reached a
collection of results in separation of powers cases-some sensible
and pragmatic, others utterly asinine. But what the Court has unde-
niably failed to do through all of these cases is to develop a law of
separation of powers, a body of principle and theory that is coherent
and useful in enabling the system "to be wiser than the individuals
who constitute it.''4 If anything, our separation of powers law is
now dumber than the individuals who make it, as if there were some
virtue in judges blinding themselves to the practical consequences
of their decisions about governmental structure. 5
I do not share the conclusion evidently reached by some other
participants in the symposium that the primary cause for the sad
state of our separation of powers jurisprudence is to be found in the
limitations of the justices who currently, or in the recent past, popu-
lated the Supreme Court. I am no great fan of the Burger Court,
but it seems to me that we should try whenever possible to avoid a
"jurisprudence of personalities." It diverts our attention from the
deeper, more fundamental causes of our woes, 6 which, ironically,
are also more susceptible to our control as teachers of the next gen-
eration of lawyers. It is to these deeper, more abstract, and theoreti-
cal causes of the disease in our separation of powers jurisprudence
that I want to turn.
4. Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal Process as Artificial Intelligence, 13 J. LEGAL STuD.
113, 145 (1984).
5. The strongest defense of the formalist position that judges should ignore the
practical consequenses of their decisions has come from my colleague at Yale, Professor
Stephen L. Carter, who argues that the predominant value in separation of powers law is
that government ought not become a "lawbreaker" by contravening the strictures laid
down in the Constitution. Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subse-
quent De-Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 727 [hereinafter
Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar]; see also Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Inde-
terminate Text: A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE LJ. 821 (1985) [herein-
after Carter, Constitutional Adjudication] (arguing that strict application of "structural"
clauses of the Constitution "legitimates" judicial review in protection of individual
rights).
Carter's argument is circular in that it assumes that the practical effect on the opera-
tions of government plays no role in determining whether a measure is constitutional.
6. Cf Elliott, Regulating the Deficit After Bowsher v. Synar, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 317,
350-51 (1987) (contrasting "normal politics," during which most people believe
problems can be solved "by replacing the people in authority," with "constitutional mo-
ments" in which people realize that the sources of problems are structural).
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My basic thesis is that separation of powers is different. It calls for
different styles of judicial reasoning, and perhaps even for a differ-
ent conception of the nature of the judicial enterprise and the role
of the Supreme Court.7 The conception of constitutional interpre-
tation that the Supreme Court has unthinkingly borrowed from
other areas of constitutional law is fundamentally unsuited to the
separation of powers field because it places undue emphasis on the
words of the Constitution.
In interpreting most of the familiar texts in constitutional law, for
example, the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment or the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court
is construing a discrete, "uni-directional" passage that creates a lin-
guistic representation for a specific constitutional value. That is
simply not true in separation of powers law. There is no discrete
"Separation of Powers Clause" in the Constitution. Rather, the
term "separation of powers" is used to encapsulate the general
principles of constitutional structure and design that are immanent
throughout the Framers' Constitution. The Framers found it either
redundant or impossible to sum up their theory of the federal gov-
ernment in a single phrase. In a sense, the "text" in separation of
powers law is everything that the Framers did and said in making the
original Constitution plus the history of our government since the
founding.
The techniques and habits of mind that judges and lawyers have
developed for construing the Due Process Clause or the First
Amendment are fundamentally ill-suited to the separation of powers
area. Because of the nature of the issues, the clauses of the Consti-
tution establishing the organs of government and defining the rela-
tionships among them appear to have greater precision and
specificity than "open textured" provisions of the Constitution such
as the First Amendment or the Due Process Clause. In actuality,
however, literalism is an even greater danger in separation of pow-
ers than in other areas of constitutional law.
The essential flaw in prevailing separation of powers jurispru-
dence is that it (mis)understands the task of constitutional interpre-
tation in too literal a way. In a sense, separation of powers cases are
being decided as if there were a "Separation of Powers Clause" in
the Constitution that the Court could read and apply like the word-
ing of a statute or a contract.
Literalism as a theory of constitutional interpretation is responsi-
ble for generating both the "formalistic" and the "functional"
strands that have been observed in our current separation of powers
jurisprudence.8 By enforcing the words of the Constitution too
7. SeeJ. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNC-
TIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980).
8. For the idea that there are two seemingly inconsistent strands in recent separa-
tion of powers cases, which may be called the "formal" and the "functional," see
Strauss, supra note 3; Elliott, supra note 4; Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar, supra note
5; and Carter, Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 5.
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mechanically and uncreatively in its "formalistic" decisions, the
Court loses sight of, and frequently violates, the true meaning of the
Constitution. On the other hand, when the Court eschews a formal-
ist result, its "functionalist" decisions seem to lose their moorings in
the Constitution. They come across as ipse dixits because literalism
was the only mode of constitutional interpretation that seemed
available to the Court for grounding a result in the Constitution.
In the first section of what follows, illustrations of the dangers of
literalism in separation of powers jurisprudence are catalogued. My
contention is that literalism is stifling separation of powers jurispru-
dence and preventing it from becoming a positive, creative force in
our constitutional law. The source of the prevailing literalism, I ar-
gue in the second section, is a fundamental misconception of the
judicial role in separation of powers cases. This misconception can
be traced to the undue emphasis that lawyers, judges, and law
professors have placed on Marbury v. Madison and the problems of
legitimating judicial review as the central issue in constitutional law.
In the third section, I sketch briefly the difference between interpreta-
tion and literalism in the constitutional law, and suggest that judges
should change their understanding of the proper role of the courts
in separation of powers cases. Unlike Dean Choper, who would
largely abandon the judicial role in issues of governmental struc-
ture,9 I believe that there is hope that judges can still play a positive
and creative role in promoting the evolution of our governmental
structure in ways that are attuned to the values in our Constitution
and constitutional traditions.
I. Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Evaluated
The work of the U.S. courts in separation of powers law leaves
much to be desired. Unlike some other areas of constitutional law,
such as civil liberties, where the work of the federal courts has been
dynamic and creative and has arguably even made contributions to
improving the well-being of citizens in our society, in separation of
powers cases the work of our courts has been characterized by literal-
ism and negativity.
As a result, after two hundred years under our Constitution, our
courts have yet to develop a sophisticated theory of the underlying
philosophy of our structure of government. (Ask yourself: Does
anyone assign judicial opinions in courses in American government
for their perspicacity in describing the inner workings of our gov-
ernment?) The sterile, impoverished nature of the judicial literature
in separation of powers cases should be evident when we compare
decisions in this area with, for example, the splendid conceptual and
9. See J. CHOPER, supra note 7.
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rhetorical edifices that judges have constructed under the First
Amendment.10
Ironically, during the founding period the courts arguably had a
much less rich tradition and literature with which to work regarding
freedom of speech and the press l' than they did in the separation of
powers field. Yet a robust, dynamic judicial literature has flourished
under the First Amendment but has failed to develop in separation
of powers law. (Later I will suggest that the ossification of this field
of constitutional theory has occured in part precisely because the sep-
aration of powers tradition was so intellectually rich during our
early formative period, in much the same way that Shakespeare
made another major English dramatist impossible until Shaw.)
An additional consequence of the literalistic, negative tone of our
separation of powers jurisprudence is that the role of the courts in
this area must be measured primarily by how much net harm they
have done. Hardly anyone thinks that the federal courts have played
an affirmative role in moving the evolution of the structure of our
government forward; discussion of their contribution (if "contribu-
tion" it be on balance) is almost entirely in terms of how much harm
they have (allegedly) prevented, and at what cost in terms of effi-
ciency or other values.
Again a comparison to other areas of constitutional law may be
instructive. American lawyers are justly proud of the affirmative role
that the federal courts have played during the past generation in
goading our society to deal with issues of racialjustice. Contrast the
10. The concept of conduct protected by the first Amendment has evolved from
narrow beginnings. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (setting forth
the clear-and-present-danger test for restricting freedom of expression); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (defining the limits on
criminalization of allegedly subversive speech); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (concerning a state's right to criminalize association
with a seditious organization); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(applying the Establishment Clause to a state compulsory flag-salute statute); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (protecting against compelled disclosure of affiliation
with an organization under freedom of association rubric); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962) (applying the Establishment Clause to prayer in public schools); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (delevoping First Amendment defamation princi-
ples); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (establishing a three-pronged test for
analysis of Establishment Clause conflicts with freedom of expression); Virginia Phar-
macy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (concerning advertise-
ments for prescription drugs); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (setting standards for
administration of a spoils system for public employees); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853 (1982) (establishing guidelines for allowable censorship in public secondary school
libraries).
My point is only that law has developed creatively under the First Amendment. I do
not say that the Supreme Court's record in applying the First Amendment is unblem-
ished. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (allowing CIA censorship of
former employees); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (protecting corpora-
tion's right to "speak" on public-election issues); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968) (prohibiting draft card burning due to significant government interest); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding the criminal conviction of a Communist
Party members); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (upholding the criminal
conviction of a former Socialist candidate for President).
11. See generally L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985) (noting that the Fram-
ers' theoretical understanding of freedom of the press and the purpose of the Free Press
Clause was quite narrow).
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courts' affirmative contributions in civil rights with their consistent
refusal to become involved in the decades-long struggle between
Congress and the executive branch over control of the power to
make war, 12 and it should be clear that the courts cannot claim much
credit for what they have brought to fruition in separation of powers
law, but rather only for what they have prevented.
The negative, literalistic tone of this area of our constitutional law
'is even evident from the term that we conventionally apply to it,
separation of powers. The term itself conjures up simplistic notions
about our tripartite structure of government and how the roles of
the three branches of government should be kept "separate." Such
glorified crudities dominate most court decisions in the field. In
fact, however, "separation of powers" jurisprudence is nothing less
than our constitutional law about questions of governmental
structure.
It is worth remembering that the Framers of the Constitution
thought that this was all the constitutional law we really needed.
When the question of a Bill of Rights was raised at the Constitu-
tional Convention, it was quickly voted down as unnecessary. Why
draw up a paper listing of rights, reasoned the delegates led by Al-
exander Hamilton andJames Madison, when the institutional checks
built into our constitutional structure would already provide a more
effective means of guaranteeing the rights of the people?' 3
We have come a long way from the Founders' day in which sepa-
ration of powers theory was considered the foundation of constitu-
tional law. Today, separation of powers is a theoretical backwater,
which until recently was hardly even included in most law school
courses and casebooks about constitutional law. The reasons are
not hard to discern. The courts in separation of powers cases are
like a primitive tribal priesthood that still follows the forms of an
ancient religion long after the true meaning of its rituals has been
forgotten. In paying literal, even slavish, obeisance to the Framers'
intentions on the specifics of governmental organization and struc-
ture, the courts violate the deeper, more fundamental spirit of the
Framers' vision that power should be divided and balanced cre-
atively to prevent misuse.
Like the mythical beast that bends back to consume its own tail,
our separation of powers jurisprudence has become an impediment
to acheiving its true goals. The great historical contribution of the
Framers of the U.S. Constitution-the core of their constitutional
12. See Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (Stewart & Douglas, JJ., dissenting
from order denying certiorari to review constitutionality of Vietnam war).
13. For a highly readable account of these and other events at the Constitutional
Convention, see C. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPrEMBER 1787 ch. 21 (1966).
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vision-was that to minimize the shortcomings of individuals and
processes of government, institutions should be combined cre-
atively into systems so that the design of the whole compensates for
the weaknesses of the parts.1 4 Ironically, this structural "separation
of powers" approach to the problems of governing-creatively de-
signing and balancing complex institutional systems to deal with
governmental problems-has become increasingly unavailable in
the U.S. The primary reason is our courts, which claim to be "en-
forcing" the constitutional principles of "separation of powers."
However, because the courts' understanding of this constitutional
principle has been literal and unimaginative, in their zeal to enforce
the letter of the Constitution, they deny its essence.
The shortcomings of current separation of powers jurisprudence
can be illustrated by considering several recent cases in which the
Supreme Court has adjudged the constitutionality of measures de-
veloped by other branches of government to deal with significant
contemporary problems: the legislative veto, the Gramm-Rudman
deficit-reduction program, and the independent-counsel statute cre-
ated in the wake of Watergate.
In two of these three cases, the Supreme Court struck down as
unconstitutional innovative attempts by the other branches of gov-
ernment to solve contemporary problems. Even more bothersome
than the results, however, is the Court's overall approach and its
conception of the judicial role, which in each of these cases is nar-
row, literalistic, and lacking in any serious theory of government or
vision of constitutional structure.
There is really very little more to the separation of powers doc-
trine that the Court has developed in these cases than to look at the
wording of the Constitution to ascertain whether the Framers in-
tended the U.S. government (or some part thereof) to exercise a
particular power or legal device. ("Yes" in the case of independent
counsels; there is a clause in the Constitution that permits courts to
appoint "inferior officers"; 1 5 "no" for legislative vetoes, and for
Gramm-Rudman.) Were it not so sad, it would be laughable for the
Supreme Court to make pronouncements about the constitutional-
ity of innovations in governmental structure that are reminiscent of
the old farmer's edict that if God had intended us to fly, He would
have given us wings.
The Constitution was intended to create a structure of govern-
ment for the ages, not to provide an exhaustive laundry list of all the
things that the government may do to deal with changing
14. This idea is elaborated in Elliott, Book Review, 23 J. ECON. LITERATURE 654
(1985) (reviewing R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN
AIR ACT (1983)), and infra note 33.
15. "[The President] shall nominate... [etc.]; but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper . .. in the Courts of Law
.... "U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. For a discussion of Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct.
2597 (1988) (the independent-counsel case), see infra text accompanying notes 53-60.
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problems. 16 By looking at the language of the Constitution for hints
as to "what the Framers thought about" the legislative veto, or
Gramm-Rudman, when they never really thought at all about the
problems that these devices were created to solve, the courts trivial-
ize the process of turning to our history and traditions for wisdom
and guidance. 17 The proper question is whether a new measure or
device is consistent with the Framers' vision of government as re-
flected and made manifest to us by the constitutional structure that
they created, and elaborated by our subsequent history and tradi-
tions.18 This the courts almost never ask.
A. The Legislative Veto
The so-called "legislative veto" is (or more accurately, was) a legal
device invented in the 1930s to allow Congress to maintain a certain
degree of supervisory authority over broad delegations of legislative
powers to administrative agencies or officials of the executive
branch. To create a "legislative veto," Congress simply reserves
power to overrule an official's subsequent actions as part of a statute
that delegates broad, discretionary powers to an administrative
agency or executive branch official. Most of the legislative veto stat-
utes prescribe that this power can be exercised by passing a resolu-
tion of disapproval in one house of Congress. By the early 1980s,
Congress had passed over two hundred legislative-veto statutes del-
egating various powers on the condition that Congress could over-
rule the exercise of those powers in individual cases. Although
Congress rarely exercised its reserved powers, the mere existence of
statutory authority to overrule their actions was thought to make
officials to whom power had been delegated more willing to exercise
it in accordance with the will of Congress.' 9
In 1983 the Supreme Court declared the legislative veto unconsti-
tutional in an eight-to-one decision, INS v. Chadha. 20 Chadha was a
16. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) ("The Constitution is a framework for government .... It is an
inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words
of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.").
17. See Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar, supra note 5, at 795-97 (stating that argu-
ments that something is either constitutionally prohibited or permitted because the
Framers did not mention it are two sides of the same logical fallacy, and that the judge's
task is to study text and history and use her "imagination" to decide whether a measure
would "fit snugly into the system the Framers designed").
18. Cf. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAWv (1969)
(Structure and relationships established by the Constitution, not literal wording, are a
crucial factor for constitutional interpretation.)
19. See Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of
Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977) (chronicling case studies under five stat-
utes providing for legislative vetoes).
20. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). My views on the Chadha decision are elaborated in Elliott,
INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983
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British citizen of Indian extraction who came to the United States
from Kenya in 1966 on a student visa. When the visa expired and
Chadha did not leave the country, the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) began proceedings to deport him as an illegal
alien. Chadha did not deny that he was in the country illegally, but
contended that the INS should exercise its statutory discretion to
suspend deportation on grounds of "extreme hardship" because if
he were deported to either Britain or Kenya, he would be subject to
racial discrimination on account of his Indian heritage.
In 1974 an INS immigration judge agreed with Chadha's argu-
ment, but his decision was subsequently overruled by the House of
Representatives. Acting on the recommendation of the staff of the
Immigration Subcommittee, the House passed a resolution by voice
vote disapproving 6 out of 340 recent INS decisions, including the
decision in Chadha's case. Chadha then enlisted the aid of Public
Citizen, a Nader-affiliated organization, to challenge the legislative
veto on constitutional grounds.
By the time Chadha's case finally got to the Supreme Court in
1983, Chadha had married an American citizen, and accordingly was
entitled to special preference in becoming a U.S. citizen. Rather
than deciding the case on these narrow grounds, however, the
Supreme Court announced a very broad decision declaring that all
legislative vetoes were unconstitutional.
Two different textual grounds were advanced for this result.
First, the Constitution requires that before a "Bill" (or any other
"Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of [both
houses] may be necessary") can become a law, it must be
"presented" to the President to give him an opportunity to either
sign it or exercise his veto. 2' Second, the Constitution vests the leg-
islative power of the United States in a bicameral legislature com-
posed of a Senate and a House of Representatives.
22
The question presented in Chadha was whether these two proce-
dural requirements, presentment and bicameral passage, that admit-
tedly apply whenever Congress passes a law, should also apply in
each instance in which a legislative veto is invoked. (After all, the
presentment and bicameralism requirements already had been com-
plied with when Congress passed each of the two hundred statutes
setting up the legislative veto mechanisms.)
The Supreme Court attempted to answer this question via an ex-
ceedingly literal and legalistic mode of analysis. The Court began
by invoking a "presumption" that "[w]hen any Branch acts, it is pre-
sumptively exercising the power the Constitution has delegated to
it."'2 3 But to say that Congress is exercising a "legislative" (rather
Sup. CT. REV. 125, from which portions of the following discussions are drawn. Other
articles discussing the decision are Strauss, Was There A Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment
on the Supreme Courts's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789, and Tribe, The Legisla-
tive Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other Name?, 21 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1984).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3.
22. Id. § 1.
23. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
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than a judicial or executive) power is not necessarily to determine
whether Congress must follow the procedures for passing a statute.
That was the question that the legislative veto case posed: when
Congress acts by invoking a legislative veto rather than by passing
another statute, must it follow the procedures for passing statutes?
The Court went on to assert that the legislative veto is "essentially
legislative in purpose and effect" because it has "the effect of alter-
ing ... legal rights."' 24 Once again, however, the Court's reasoning
is circular. The invocation of a legislative veto only "alter[s]"
Chadha's "legal rights" if one assumes that he had an unqualified
right to remain in the country once the immigration judge ruled in
his favor. However, the statute granting the immigration judge the
power to rule in Chadha's favor had built into it the possibility that
one house of Congress might overrule that determination through a
legislative veto. Why not construe Chadha's only "legal right" as
the limited right to remain in the country unless either house of Con-
gress overrules the immigration judge? If one adopts this view that
Chadha's only legal rights were conditional, then the House's action
in invoking the legislative veto did not alter Chadha's "legal rights"
at all because the possibility of a legislative veto was built into his
rights from the beginning.
Finally, in what turns out in hindsight to have been the analytical
core of the opinion, the Court asserted that "the prescription for
legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7 [of the Constitution containing
the presentment and bicameral requirements], represents the Fram-
ers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government
be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedure." 25 This amounts to saying that any legal de-
vice or procedure not specifically authorized by the Constitution is
implicitly forbidden by it. There is an old legal maxim to that effect,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of the other"), which is sometimes used in construing con-
tracts and other legal documents. Elsewhere I have argued that
even on its own terms the expressio unius principle is inapplicable to a
document such as the Constitution, which expressly indicates, in the
Necessary and Proper Clause,26 that the listing of enumerated pow-
ers is not intended to be exclusive.
27
The main point for the moment, however, is not that the Court in
Chadha made a series of bad narrow, legalistic arguments that would
24. Id. at 952.
25. Id. at 951.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 18 ("The Congress shall have Power... To make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
[enumerated] Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Govern-
ment of the United States .... ").
27. Elliott, supra note 20, at 140-43.
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not be acceptable even if the Court were construing the fine print of
an insurance contract or a municipal bond. It is rather the more
basic point that the Court inappropriately adopted a narrow, legalis-
tic approach to an important question of separation of powers law.
Long ago ChiefJustice Marshall reminded his colleagues that "it is a
constitution we are expounding." 2 It is the import of this famous
statement that the Chadha Court seems to have forgotten.
As a leading constitutional law casebook puts it, "Chadha might be
understood as an effort to reassert an understanding of the text of
the Constitution as more or less self-contained, with clear answers
to at least some problems." 29 To say it more bluntly, the Court in
Chadha insisted on blinding itself to any of the larger considerations
that might have informed its decision. There was, for example, no
real discussion of the purposes of the provisions of the Constitution
which the Court purported to be construing, or how they might fit
into any larger vision of separation of powers doctrine. This is par-
ticularly troubling because, as Justice White pointed out in dissent, a
"modern administrative state" has arisen since 1789 in which
unelected bureaucrats now have enormous discretion to make law
essentially outside the eighteenth-century system of checks and bal-
ances created by the Framers. 30 Arguably, the legislative veto
served to advance the true purposes of the principle of separation of
powers that the Framers built into the Constitution by giving
elected legislative officials an effective check over lawmaking by ad-
ministrative bureaucrats. 3 '
It would be possible to refute these structural arguments, of
course, by positing a counter-theory of the true meaning of the con-
stitutional principle of separation of powers. For example, one
leading constitutional law casebook attempts to answer my position
that the Court's expressio unius argument in Chadha is nonsense by
suggesting that it might be "plausible to respond that the expressio
unius argument is supported by structural arguments having to do
with the framers' fear of factional tyranny."
32
No one has yet suggested what the content of these hypothetical
"structural arguments" connecting the legislative veto with the
Framers' concerns about "factional tyranny" might be. Remember:
the proper question is not whether "factions"-today we call them
"special interest groups"-may sometimes have too much influence
over the congressional staffs that play a major role in deciding
whether to exercise the legislative veto (I would concede that point);
rather, the proper question is comparative: are we better or worse
28. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis added).
29. G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 385
(1986) [hereinafter STONE & SEIDMAN].
30. Ins v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1002 (1983) (White,J., dissenting).
31. See Karl, Rule-Making Powers: An American Dilemma, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1983, at
A18, col. 4 (letter to the editor); see also Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving
the Constitutional Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367, 371 (1977) (stating that "[tlhe most impor-
tant aspect of the [legislative] veto is that it prevents, or at least postpones, executive
actions from taking effect").
32. STONE & SEIDMAN, supra note 29, at 384 (emphasis added).
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off in terms of the risk of "factional tyrrany" if a faction must domi-
nate both the administrative decisionmaker and the congressional
staff, or only one of them, in order to get its program adopted? For
the Framers' answer, see The Federalist No. 51. 33
33. A fundamental principle of institutional design reflected in numerous ways
throughout the Constitution, Madison explains in Federalist No. 51, was to disperse gov-
ernmental power among multiple institutions, and often to require the concurrence of
several of them, before the state was permitted to act. This is an application of what
modern design engineers call the principle of "redundant design." The premise is sim-
ple. Just as there are no perfect, failure-proof mechanical components, there are no
perfect governmental institutions; every institution invented by humans is subject to
characteristic flaws and abuses. By combining these admittedly flawed components into
a composite structure, however, the whole can be made much less vulnerable than its
parts.
The central idea of redundant design is to arrange the parts so that their shortcom-
ings compensate, or at least cancel out, one another. To take a familiar example, an
interest group that is concentrated in the larger states might be able to dominate the
House of Representatives, but it could be blocked in the Senate, in which power is or-
ganized along different lines. Neither population nor geography is the perfect principle
of representation; the two in combination are, however, less prone to failure than either
alone.
In Federalist No. 51, Madison reminds us that this guiding principle of redundant, mu-
tually checking power centers runs throughout the design of our government: "This
policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might
be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public." THE
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Another obvious exam-
ple is the division of authority between state and federal governments:
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to
the administration of a single government .... In the compound republic of
America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two
distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided
among distinct and separate departments. Hence, a double security arises to
the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other,
at the same time that each will be controlled by itseslf.
Id. at 323.
The theory that dividing authority into a multiplicity of parts provides a bulwark
against abuse was also a mainstay of the Framers' defense against possible abuses of
power by electoral majorities:
Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a major-
ity be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be inse-
cure .... [The method adopted in the Constitution for] providing against
this evil [is] by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions
of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole
very improbable, if not impracticable.
Id. at 323-24.
The same philosophy that multiple competing power centers would balance one an-
other was also part of the rationale undergirding the Framers' commitment to political
and religious freedom:
In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for
religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests,
and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both
cases will depend on the number of interests and sects ...."
Id. at 324. In instance after instance in Federalist .o. 51, Madison counsels that power
should be shared and divided among multiple centers, organized in different ways, to
counter-balance one another. We should learn from the Framers' example and extend
their wisdom to the choices we make in our own time about the design of governmental
institutions.
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The legislative veto would in fact tend to reduce the risks of "fac-
tional tyranny" (undue influence by special interest groups) by mak-
ing it necessary for the special interest group to dominate two
different institutions, the agency and the congressional staff, in
order to work its will. This is the essence of the Framers' solution to
the problem of "factional tyrrany": creating multiple power centers
with different features as checks on one another so that a faction
would have to take control of all of them in order to prevail.
34
What an irony that the Framers' "fear of factional tyrany" is cited
as an excuse for precluding us from implementing the Framers' so-
lution to the problem of factional tyrrany.
Leaving the merits of these arguments about structural principles
aside, however, the point for our present inquiry is that in the
Chadha decision, the Supreme Court did not even get to this level of
analysis. The Court gave no indication that it believed that the pro-
visions of the Constitution relating to separation of powers even
have purposes, much less discussed what they might be. Rather, the
Court treated what it took to be the structural portions of the Con-
stitution as mysterious edicts from on-high that we dare not even
attempt to fathom.
When Justice White in dissent raised the problem of administra-
tive lawmaking, the Court responded with the piety of a Pharisee:
"the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and
useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, -will
not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.- 35 This is the rigid,
sanctimonious attitude typical of priesthoods the world over when
they have lost touch with the substance of their religion, and there-
fore must convince themselves that it still exists by extreme efforts
to preserve its outer forms. Doesn't the fact that a given procedure
is "useful in facilitating functions of government" have anything to
do with whether it violates the constitutional principle of separation
of powers? The Framers certainly thought so. Their purpose in
creating separation of powers doctrine was to "facilitate the func-
tions of government."
B. Gramm-Rudman
The Supreme Court's next major separation of powers decision,
Bowsher v. Synar,36 striking down as unconstitutional the Gramm-
Rudman deficit-reduction statute, was not much better than Chadha.
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
198537 (usually referred to by its popular name, "Gramm-Rudman,"
after two of its principal sponsors) was passed to deal with what the
Supreme Court characterized as "fiscal and economic problems of
unprecedented magnitude,"38 namely, a federal budget deficit that
34. See supra note 33.
35. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
36. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
37. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-922 (West Supp. 1988).
38. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 736.
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appears to many people to be out of control.39 It is clearly beyond
the scope of this paper to venture into the ongoing argument
among economists about how much of a threat the deficit really con-
stitutes. Interesting and difficult legal issues are nonetheless raised
by attempts to control the deficit. The crucial legal problem posed
by efforts to regulate the deficit is how-and indeed, whether-the
U.S. government can pass a law that will effectively control its future
spending and taxing decisions without violating the Constitution.40
Gramm-Rudman attempted to deal with this problem by declaring
a series of statutory ceilings on the size of the deficit, which would
decline over a period of years until the deficit was eliminated. That
aspect of Gramm-Rudman was hardly unique. Prior to Gramm-
Rudman, Congress had previously passed statutory "ceilings" on
the size of the national debt and the deficit, only to ignore them
later when it became convenient to do so.4 ' Gramm-Rudman went
beyond this familiar approach by creating an extremely clever
"sanction" to deter Congress from passing spending bills that
would increase the deficit above the limits: under Gramm-Rudman,
if the targets were exceeded, an across-the-board "sequestration"
procedure would go into effect automatically to cut all non-exempt
federal spending programs by the amount necessary to get total
spending back below the deficit targets.42 The sequestration proce-
dure was intended to be an effective sanction to deter Congress
from exceeding the targets precisely because it was politically un-
thinkable that Congress would permit across-the-board spending
cuts in its favorite programs to go into effect. In other words, be-
cause the ultimate remedy of across-the-board spending cuts was so
unpalatable, a new system of political incentives was created that
used the political support for existing spending programs as a coun-
terweight against new ones. There were no guarantees that this
"separation of powers" approach to controlling the deficit would
work, but there was hope that under the threat of automatic, across-
the-board cuts, Congress and the President might act to prevent the
deficit targets from being exceeded.
In Bowsher v. Synar, the Supreme Court struck down this carefully
39. My views on the deficit and possible legal mechanisms to control it are set out in
Elliott, supra note 6, and Elliott, Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit, 1985 DUKE L.J.
1077.
40. See Kahn, Gramm-Rudmnan and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 185 (1986) (concluding that control of future spending can be ac-
complished constitutionally only through a constitutional amendment).
41. See, e.g., Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1(a), 98 Stat. 494,
1057 (1984), 26 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 1986) (establishing deficit ceilings).
42. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 901, 902 (West Supp. 1988). For a more detailed explanation of
Gramm-Rudman and its relationship to the structure of the spending and appropria-
tions processes generally, see Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (1988).
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crafted attempt to alter the structure of institutional incentives for
Congress and the President to deal with the deficit on what must be
regarded as a purely hypothetical legal technicality. The crux of the
Supreme Court's objection to the sequestration procedure was that
there was a sixty-five year old statute, which had never actually been
used, giving Congress the power to fire the Comptroller General of
the United States-the official to whom the task had been given of
projecting the deficit and calculating the size of the cuts necessary to
bring spending back within the deficit targets. According to the
Court, making this calculation was an exclusively "executive" func-
tion, and therefore, it could not be performed by an "agent" of the
legislative branch without violating the constitutional principles of
separation of powers: "By placing the responsibility for execution
of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act in the
hands of an officer who is subject to removal only by itself, Congress
in effect has retained control over the execution of the Act and has
intruded into the executive function." 43
The Court's "reasoning" (if that term does not overly dignify it) is
wrong on at least three levels. First, is the Comptroller General
necessarily an "agent" of the legislative branch just because a stat-
ute gives Congress the hypothetical, never-exercised authority to re-
move him for cause? Second, and more important, are the
Comptroller General's functions under Gramm-Rudman inherently
"executive" just because they involve "executing" the law in the
sense of carrying out its commands? And third, even if the Comp-
troller General's role is assumed to be at least partially "executive"
in this sense, does the Constitution necessarily prohibit giving offi-
cials subject to removal by the legislature the task of carrying out the
commands of the law? Elsewhere I have explained in detail why I
believe that the Court's answers to each of these three questions in
Bowsher were plainly wrong.4 4 The main point here is not to re-
hearse these arguments, but to illustrate that in Bowsher, as in
Chadha, the Court's whole approach to the separation of powers is-
sues before it consisted of arid, simplistic conceptualism rather than
an attempt to achieve a real understanding of the goals that separa-
tion of powers principles were intended to serve.
Consider, for example, the Court's stated reasons for considering
the Comptroller General's functions to be "executive":
[W]e view these functions as plainly entailing execution of the law
in constitutional terms. Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to
implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of "execu-
tion" of the law. Under § 251, the Comptroller General must exer-
cise judgment concerning facts that affect the application of the Act. He
must also interpret the provisions of the Act to determine precisely
what budgetary calculations are required. Decisions of that kind
are typically made by officers charged with executing a statute.45
43. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986).
44. See Elliott, supra note 6, at 320-32.
45. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732-33 (emphasis added).
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Isn't it both surprising and sad that two hundred years after the
Constitution was adopted, the Supreme Court's stated theory of
what constitutes an "executive" function turns on nothing more
profound than the common etymological roots of the words executive
and execute? It is true that one clause of the Constitution vests the
"executive" power of the United States in the President,46 and that
another directs the President to "take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed."' 47 But it simply does not follow, either logically or
practically, that all government officials who faithfully carry out the
commands of the law in performing their assigned duties must
therefore be members of the executive branch.
In fact, the functions that Gramm-Rudman assigns to the Comp-
troller General-"interpreting" the law and "apply[ing]" it to
facts4 8-are actually more typically judicial in nature than they are
executive. Under the terms of Gramm-Rudman, the Comptroller
General's report is not immediately effective to sequester appropri-
ated funds. Rather, the statute requires the President to take fur-
ther action to carry out the Comptroller General's determinations as
to what the law requires. 49 Thus, the Comptroller General per-
forms the prototypical judicial roles of interpreting the law, apply-
ing it to specific facts, and issuing ajudgment, which the President is
then duty-bound to carry out.
That arrangement in itself raises a serious separation of powers
issue: Can the President be bound to follow the determination by a
subsidiary official as to what the law requires? 50 But, as in Chadha,
the Court never even got to the serious questions posed by the stat-
ute. Its analysis stopped with a silly word game that equated "exe-
cuting" the laws with the "executive" branch. Once again there was
no attempt to ask why the Framers chose to separate the executive
and legislative branches, or to figure out whether the institutional
arrangements created by Gramm-Rudman would effectuate rather
than contradict the separation of powers principles that the Framers
built into the Constitution.
The fundamental fallacy in Bowsher v. Synar is not that the Court
picked the wrong conceptual box in which to pigeonhole the Comp-
troller General's functions (executive, rather than judicial), but in-
stead that the Court presumed that separation of powers law could
be reduced to simplistic labels and definitions:
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, ci. 1.
47. Id. art. II, § 3.
48. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732-33.
49. 2 U.S.C.A. § 902(a)(3) (West Supp. 1988).
50. See Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838) (holding that the Cir-
cuit Court of the District of Columbia had jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to
compel the Postmaster General to perform a ministerial duty); Elliott, supra note 6, at
330-32 (discussing Kendall).
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The constitutional theory of separation of powers is by its nature
holistic; it draws its meaning from the totality of the structures
created by the Constitution and the history of how our insitutions
have evolved. No simple definition, no matter how well-crafted,
can encapsulate all the wisdom implicit in the structure of the
Constitution and our political history. By resorting to ajurispru-
dence of definitions, the [Bowsher] Court inevitably oversimplifies
the issues in separation of powers cases. 51
To be sure, if one is sufficiently determined, a rationalization can
always be invented to explain the result in a case like Bowsher. For
example, it might be suggested that the Court acted responsibly by
striking down Gramm-Rudman on a technicality that could easily be
remedied by amending the statute (i.e., by repealing Congress's
power to remove the Comptroller General from office, or by reas-
signing his tasks relating to sequestrations under Gramm-Rudman
to an official of the executive branch, such as the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget). On this reading, what the
Supreme Court was "really saying" in Bowsher was that Congress
may make fundamental changes in institutional relationships by stat-
ute without amending the Constitution, but only if the country is
"really serious" as demonstated by the fact that more than one Con-
gress is willing to agree to the change.5 2 In my view, this charitable
interpretation of Bowsher (which, so far as I know, no one else has
ever even suggested) is too clever by half. There is not the slightest
clue in the Bowsher opinion that the Court actually had anything be-
yond the most barren literalism in mind.
C. Independent Counsels
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Morrison v. Olson,53 up-
holding the constitutionality of the "independent counsel" statute
passed in the wake of Watergate, 54 may seem to contradict my pessi-
mism about the role of the courts in separation of powers cases.
There is no doubt that both the result and some of the language in
Morrison represent substantial improvements over decisions like
Chadha and Bowsher. For example, the majority opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Morrison goes out of its way to criticize deci-
sions such as Bowsher that are based on "rigid categories" of execu-
tive, judicial, and legislative, and to acknowledge the "difficulty of
defining such categories." 55 And although I do not agree with his
conclusions, Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion holds some promise
for the future of separation of powers law, in that Justice Scalia at
least attempts to go beyond literalism to begin a conversation about
51. Elliott, supra note 6, at 327-28.
52. Cf G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 8-15 (1982) (re-
viewing techniques courts use to require more than one legislature to reaffirm a policy).
53. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
54. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986).
55. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2618 & n.28.
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the fundamental purposes that separation of powers law was in-
tended to serve.
Nonetheless, despite these hopeful signs, on some of the crucial
issues the Court's reasoning in Morrison is almost as narrowly
gauged and literalistic as the Court's reasoning in Chadha and Bow-
sher. The statute at issue in Morrison provides that whenever reason-
able grounds exist to believe that certain high-ranking government
officials may have violated federal criminal laws, the Attorney Gen-
eral shall request a special court to appoint an "independent coun-
sel" (formerly called a "special prosecutor") to investigate, and if
appropriate, to prosecute, outside of regular Department of Justice
channels. 56 This statutory scheme was challenged on three interre-
lated constitutional grounds: (1) that it infringes on the President's
constitutional powers to appoint officers of the United States;
(2) that the courts cannot be assigned an inherently "nonjudicial"
task such as appointing and supervising independent counsels; and
(3) that prosecuting crimes is an inherently "executive" function
that cannot be removed from presidential supervision and control.
57
In rejecting these arguments, the Court placed heavy reliance on the
specific language of the Appointments Clause:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law:
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers,
as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments.5
8
Although the Court in Morrison reached the right result, I read the
opinion as resting less on the fundamental separation of powers
principle that "no man should be judge of his own case" than on the
specific language of the Appointments Clause. Suppose that the
Constitution did not contain specific language permitting the courts
to appoint inferior officials; would the independent-counsel statute
be any less constitutional? I would say clearly not, but based on the
opinion in Morrison and the Court's overall record in separation of
powers cases, I doubt that it would agree. The predominant charac-
teristic of the Supreme Court's separation of powers jurisprudence
is literalism (which must be strongly distinguished from a true respect
for the text). By making important questions of constitutional law
turn on issues of phrasing, rather than on structure and history, the
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591, 592(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
57. Brief for Appellee at 9-13, Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988) (No. 87-
1279).
58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court has built its separation of powers jurisprudence on
sand (or worse).
The mental image that most people have of the Framers of the
Constitution painstakingly debating and rewriting the Constitution
line-by-line at the Constitutional Convention is simply false.5 9 The
Constitutional Convention debated and voted on principles of consti-
tutional structure, as reflected in a series of resolutions. The actual
wording of the Constitution, however, was written by a committee
of five men, headed by Gouverneur Morris, over what amounted to
a long weekend. 60
There is no question that we can, and should, draw meaning from
the structural choices made by the Framers, as well as the choices
made by others throughout our subsequent constitutional history,
but we might as well make our constitutional fate turn on the en-
trails of birds so as to entrust the constitutionality of innovations in
governmental structure to whether Gouverneur Morris and other
members of the "Committee on Style" thought to put a particular
word or phrase into their draft of the Constitution.
D. "The Best and Brightest'"
Lest it be suspected that I have selected the weakest of the
Supreme Court's recent separation of powers opinions to show it in
a bad light (or alternatively, that the Burger Court was merely more
benighted in this area than its predecessors), in this section an ex-
ample of separation of powers' "best and brightest" opinions is dis-
cussed. These are the opinions that are traditionally singled out in
articles or teaching materials for study as particularly interesting
due to the larger theoretical contributions that they allegedly make
to the field of separation of powers law.
One such opinion is the famous Steel Seizure Case, Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer.6 1 In 1951, in the midst of the Korean War, the
steelworkers union called a national strike, shutting down the flow
of steel to the country's factories including those manufacturing war
materials, thereby allegedly jeopardizing U.S. troops in the field in
Korea. After efforts at mediation failed, President Truman issued
an executive order temporarily taking over the steel mills on behalf
of the U.S. government and ordering them back into operation.
The Supreme Court subsequently declared President Truman's
actions unconstitutional. After noting that two statutes had been
passed by Congress giving the President explicit authority to seize
private property, but that President Truman's actions did not come
within either of them, the majority opinion by Justice Black declared
that President Truman's executive order was an impermissible at-
tempt by the executive branch to exercise "lawmaking" powers and
59. Cf Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the
Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE LJ. (forthcoming).
60. C. BOWEN, supra note 13, at 234-38.
61. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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therefore violated the constitutional principle of separation of pow-
ers: "The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power
to the Congress alone in both good and bad times."
62
The result may be correct, but as a matter of constitutional the-
ory, Justice Black's explanation simply will not do. Both before and
after the Court's opinion in Youngstown, the executive branch has is-
sued over ten thousand executive orders, many of which plainly
"make laws" in every sense at least as much as did the Steel Seizure
order.63 Are we to understand that all of these executive orders by
the executive branch are also unconstitutional? If not, what distin-
guishes the impermissible kind of "lawmaking" at issue in Youngs-
town from that routinely engaged in by the executive branch?
Perhaps it was to address these troubling questions that Justice
Jackson wrote his famous concurrence in Youngstown. Jackson began
with an extraordinary confession of the "poverty" of existing theo-
ries of separation of powers:
A judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at the pov-
erty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to con-
crete problems of executive power as they actually present
themselves. Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have
envisioned had they foreseen modem conditions, must be divined
from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was
called upon to interpret for Pharoah. A century and a half of par-
tisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but
only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources
on each side of any question.
64
Next, Jackson described the reasons why more refined understand-
ings of separation of powers principles are necessary and why courts
should not decide these cases based on literal interpretations of the
Constitution:
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not
and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of
its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn
from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the
dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity. 65
62. Id. at 589.
63. SeeJ. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM CASES AND MATERIALS 140-42 (2d ed. 1985). For example, a few years before
the Steel Seizure Case, President Truman issued an order desegregating the armed forces.
Exec. Order No. 9980, 3 C.F.R. 720 (1943-1948).
64. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634-35 (Jackson. J., concurring).
65. Id. at 635.
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Having decried the lack of any useful theories of separation of pow-
ers, and having described the reasons why such theories are essen-
tial, Jackson moved on to sketch the outlines of his own contribution
to the search for the meaning of the constitutional principle of sepa-
ration of powers.
Woodrow Wilson once wrote that the Framers of the U.S. Consti-
tution based their theory of "political dynamics" on an "uncon-
scious copy of the Newtonian theory of the universe;" 66 if so,Justice
Jackson's updated model of the political universe is based on Ein-
stein's concept of relativity:
Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon
their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress....
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Con-
gress can delegate....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he
and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its dis-
tribution is uncertain....
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the
express or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers mi-
nus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter .... 67
There is no question that Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngs-
town is a good deal deeper and more thoughtful than most of the
Supreme Court's efforts in the separation of powers field-say
Chadha, for example. Indeed, Jackson's concurrence might be
among the most profound pieces ofjudicial literature written in the
twentieth century about separation of powers issues. (A recent con-
stitutional law text writes that Justice Jackson, one of the great jus-
tices of the twentieth century, is "perhaps best remembered for his
graceful prose and his subtle and original efforts to articulate a co-
herent theory of separation of powers in his opinions in cases such
as Youngstown. "68) But judged by the standard of the "best and
brightest," how good really is Jackson's Youngstown concurrence?
Stripped of its poetry, which dresses up the ideas and makes them
harder to evaluate, Jackson's separation of powers "theory" comes
down to telling us that when the President acts with Congress be-
hind him, he has more power than when he doesn't. That is some-
thing worth knowing, and perhaps it was helpful in deciding the
particular case before the Court in Youngstown (although to know
that the President would have "more" power if he acted with
congressional authorization doesn't really answer the question
66. W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 54-55 (Co-
lumbia paperback ed. 1961).
67. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1957) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
68. STONE & SEIDMAN, supra note 29, at lxiii.
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whether he has "enough" when he acts without it). But more funda-
mentally, how useful is Justice Jackson's theory of expanding and
contracting spheres of power as a source of guidance for deciding
other separation of powers cases? The implicit underpinning of
Jackson's view of separation of powers is the vision of three interact-
ing realms of power: executive, legislative, and judicial. How are
judges to decide what is in these orbits and what is outside of them?
A related question is "From whence does all of this come?" Jackson
merely announces his theory of these three spheres of governmental
power contracting and expanding in dynamic relation to one an-
other; he does not connect it to anything, except perhaps the idea
that the constitutional system of government must be "workable."
The problem of grounding Jackson's Youngstown concurrence in any-
thing more substantial than assertion is also a fundamental problem
for our separation of powers law more generally. Long ago Justice
Holmes pointed out that legal concepts like "executive, judicial, and
legislative" are not "things" that "have" immutable existences;
rather, they are constructs that we create to serve purposes, and
these purposes should define their reach and measure.69
As long as the courts persist in analyzing separation of powers
questions by asking whether a particular function "is" executive or
legislative, their task will be hopeless. Only when they begin to at-
tack these problems by abstracting and elaborating theories of what
goals separation of powers law should serve, and then asking
whether a particular function should be deemed to be executive in
light of those goals, can they hope to make any progress.
I. Beyond Marbury and the Jurisprudence of Inputs
From the beginning, American judges and legal scholars have
been obsessed with questions concerning the legitimacy of judicial
review and corollary problems of what sources of law judges may
properly consider in deciding constitutional cases. For conven-
ience, let us call this "the jurisprudence of inputs," because it fo-
cuses almost exclusively on what judges may take into account in
deciding constitutional cases.
The main lines of the debate in the jurisprudence of inputs were
laid down in the early days of the Republic by Chief Justice John
Marshall in his defense of judicial review in Marbury v. ladison.
70
Virtually every law school course in constitutional law begins with
69. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 460 (1899) ("We
must think things not words, or at least we must constantly translate our words into the
facts for which they stand, if we are to keep to the real and the true.").
70. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Marbury, and its antinomy, McCulloch v. Maryland, 7 and the two to-
gether have largely defined the intellectual space for constitutional
law (at least in the law schools). I want to suggest, however, that the
prevailing definition of constitutional law in terms of Marbury and
the jurisprudence of inputs has been a crucial factor in impoverish-
ing constitutional thought in the field of separation of powers, and
perhaps more broadly as well.
The essential justification for judicial review that Chief Justice
Marshall posits in Marbury turns on an analogy between the Consti-
tution and other legal documents, such as contracts or statutes. As
my colleague, Professor Robert Burt, recently put the point, "the
textuality of the Constitution is the key for the conventional justifi-
cations of American judicial review."'72 Textuality, however, is not
the only plausible justification that might be given for judicial re-
view, as is demonstrated by Professor Burt's forthcoming compara-
tive study of the development ofjudicial review in Israel, which has
no written constitution. For example, Alexander Hamilton's justifi-
cation forjudicial review in The Federalist No. 78 is really quite differ-
ent from Marshall's in Marbury, and relies far less, if at all, on the
written nature of the Constitution. In a similar vein, Professor Bar-
bara Black has suggested that judicial review by courts on issues of
constitutional law is "obvious enough to go without saying" from
the nature of courts and their role in the structure of government
created by the Constitution.
73
Nonetheless, Marshall's justification for judicial review in terms of
texts in Marbury, which has itself become constitutional law's leading
text, has had profound implications for all that has come thereafter.
Under the justification for judicial review given in Marbuy-but not
under the others that might have been given-the strongest, most
legitimate constitutional argument is one based on the text of the
Constitution itself.74 A close second is an argument based on other
closely related texts from the founding period, such as the debates
of the Constitutional Convention and The Federalist Papers.
Unlike most other areas of constitutional law, separation of pow-
ers law was "blessed" with a comparative wealth of these early texts.
These early texts applying separation of powers concepts to various
problems encountered during the founding period have made it
easy to decide separation of powers cases literally. For example, in
Bowsher, Chief Justice Burger can point to the Founders' fears that
the Congress might aggrandize its power at the expense of the other
71. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
72. R. Burt, Inventing Judicial Review: Israel and America, 1 (draft, Yale Law
School Faculty Workshop, Oct. 3, 1988) (quoted by permission of the author) (copy on
file at the George Washington Law Review).
73. Black, An Astonishing Political Innovation: The Origins ofJudicial Review, 49 U. Prr.
L. REV. 691, 695-96 (1988).
74. Elsewhere I have argued that undisputed legitimacy of textual arguments in
American constitutional law causes them to predominate over "nontextual" arguments
over the long run. E.D. Elliott, What's Wrong With Our Constitutional Law Process
(Georgetown University Law Center "After the Bicentennial" Conference, Nov. 14-15,
1987) (unpublished working paper on file with the George Washington Law Review).
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branches.75 Under Marbury and the conventional understanding of
the jurisprudence of inputs, this would appear to be a highly author-
itative insight. But does the fact that the Framers feared legislative
(rather than presidential) aggrandizement in 1787 really imply that
it should be our primary concern in 1987?
Just as wealth that comes too easily in other spheres of life may
stifle and impoverish the spirit, so too a wealth of relevant textual
material in separation of powers law has made it easy to decide, but
may make it harder to learn to decide well. By this line of reasoning,
separation of powers law has failed to develop a rich theoretical
foundation precisely because these concepts were so prominent
during the Founders' era.
This line of analysis may provide a partial explanation for the rela-
tive impoverishment of separation of powers law, but it alone is
probably insufficient. In view of the absence of any specific "Sepa-
ration of Powers Clause" in the Constitution, it may seem odd to
suggest that the prevailing literalism in this area is due to the pre-
dominance of texts which have crowded out other modes of consti-
tutional analysis. (However, a Freudian might argue that the very
absence of an explicit textual foundation for the "separation of pow-
ers doctrine" has caused judges to fix unduly on secondary textual
authority in applying these doctrines.)
There is also another reason to be suspicious of whether this line
of analysis alone is powerful enough to explain the relative impover-
ishment of separation of powers law. Other areas of constitutional
law were formerly dominated by a textual literalism reminiscent of
that which currently afflicts separation of powers law. Many of them
have broken these conceptual bonds, and have grown into some-
thing more in the twentieth century. Why, for example, have courts
been able to expand the Fourth Amendment beyond the boundaries
of the common law of trespass, but have not yet made similar con-
ceptual advances in separation of powers law?
In part, the answer may lie in our conception of the nature of
modernity as contrasted with our perception of the essential con-
tinuity of our governmental institutions. When judges confront the
question of whether wiretapping a conversation in a telephone
booth violates the Constitution, 76 it is obvious to them that the
eighteenth century Framers of the Constitution had no opinions
about the wiretapping of telephones, and therefore the judges are
driven to try to abstract from specifics to deeper, more fundamental
theories of what constitutional provisions are about. It is equally
75. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1986) (discussing the Founders' con-
cerns with legislative interference in executive matters).
76. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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true-but not nearly so obvious-that the "executive" of 1789 is not
the "executive" of 1989.
Rather than applying separation of powers texts literally, the
courts should be striving to reach a deeper, more fundamental, and
therefore more relevant understanding of our separation of powers
traditions, as they sometimes have in other areas of constitutional
law. Professor Stephen Carter may be right that literal application
of the structural provisions of the Constitution legitimates judicial
review, 77 but it is the wrong kind of judicial review that gets
legitimated.
III. Toward Interpretation in Separation of Powers Jurisprudence
The central fallacy that ails our separation of powers jurispru-
dence grows out of a failure to distinguish between interpretation and
literalism in applying the Constitution.
No text applies itself. A text, like any other set of symbols, must
be related to its environment through a process by which meaning is
created. But the environment is always changing, and consequently,
relating a text to its environment and thereby giving it meaning is
problematic. Literalism does not escape this problem; it merely ob-
scures the problem by abandoning the choice of meanings to the
general cultural evolution of language. Thus, to the literalist, it
seems self-evident that when the Framers referred to "the executive
branch" in 1787, they meant to include everything that we call "the
executive branch" today, even though the things that are actually
encompassed by the term are now quite different. Why? Because
our language has evolved so that the words "the executive branch"
are now generally understood to encompass things that were not
included (or did even not exist) when the Framers used those words
in the Constitution.
For the interpreter, on the other hand, it does not follow so easily
that the general evolution of the meanings of words in the language
should control the interpretation of an ancient text, particularly not
one like a constitution that was created to serve certain purposes.
The interpreter would want to try to imagine herself moving be-
tween the Framers' world and ours, and trying as best she could to
translate the symbols of one to the other. From this perspective, it
is not at all clear that "the executive" of 1789 means "the execu-
tive" of 1989; the issue would depend on the context and the consti-
tutional and statutory purposes involved.
The problem I have just described is a general one for constitu-
tional law, where we must always try to give meaning to symbols
across two hundred years of historical distance. It is exacerbated for
separation of powers by the absence of a single, general text that
77. See Carter, ConstitutionalAdjudication, supra note 5, at 855 (stating that strict appli-
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states a broad, constitutional principal. (One could imagine, for ex-
ample, a proviso to the Necessary and Proper Clause that stated
"However, in establishing such other offices and institutions, Con-
gress shall take Care not to concentrate power unduly such that it
might be abused.")
In lieu of such a "Separation of Powers Clause," we are given a
number of specific clauses that constitute the three branches of gov-
ernment and define relationships among them. It is a mistake to
imagine, however, that the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers is coterminious with the specific provisions of the Constitu-
tion creating the government. These words, in historical context,
created the doctrine of separation of powers, but they do not ex-
haust it.
The point can be clarified, perhaps, by reference to Ronald Dwor-
kin's distinction between general "concepts" and specific "concep-
tions."'78 Dworkin argues that the great, open-textured provisions
of the Constitution, such as the Due Process Clause, do not embody
the specific "conceptions" of fairness that the Framers may have had
in mind, but rather refer to the general concept of fairness itself,
which the Framers presumably recognized would develop and
change over time.79
The problem in separation of powers is just the reverse: we are
given the specific conceptions of governmental structure by the con-
stitutional text, but we must abstract the general concept(s) from
the specifics for ourselves. Lack of an abstract statement of the prin-
ciple(s) of separation of powers in the text of the Constitution itself
has made it particularly difficult for judges to escape the bonds of
literalism in order to engage in true interpretation.
Let me provide one specific illustration of how an interpretive ap-
proach to separation of powers law would differ from the prevailing
regime of literalism. Under the prevailing literalism, "independent
agencies" occupy a constitutionally questionable status. 80 Why?
Because they are nowhere mentioned in the text of the Constitution,
which creates only three branches of government. It has been con-
ventionally thought by literalists that independent agencies must be
78. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHrrs SERIOUSLY 133-36 (1979) (distinguishing gen-
eral "concept" of fairness from "specific conceptions" of fairness held by the Framers).
79. Id.; see also Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv.
885, 948 (1985) (arguing that the Framers did not intend future interpreters of the Con-
stitution to be guided by the Framers' own "purposes, expectations, and intentions").
80. See, e.g., A Symposium on Administrative Law: "The Uneasy Constitutional Status of Ad-
ministrative Agencies," 36 AM. U.L. REV. 277 (1987) (including essays by several authors
who examine, among other things, executive delegation of authority to administrative
agencies); Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 41, 43 (stating that independ-
ent agencies have yet to overcome "constitutional questions").
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"in" one of the three branches of government, most likely the exec-
utive branch. But if they are "in" the executive branch, why aren't
they subject to control by the President, in whom the Constitution
"vests" the executive power?
This conundrum is a difficult one for the literalist who equates the
doctrine of separation of powers with specific provisions of the Con-
stitution; it becomes much more tractable for the interpreter. The
interpreter asks not only what the Framers did, but also why, so that
she can try to translate their wisdom to our own differing circum-
stances and conditions. The interpreter tries to divine a principle
behind the Framers' act of creating three branches of government,
and seeks to apply the meaning of their words rather than the words
themselves. She asks whether these purposes would be effectuated
by permitting Congress to create agencies whose heads cannot be
fired by the President. If it does not contravene the reasons why the
Framers created three branches-what John Marshall called "the
spirit of the Constitution" 8 i-then a measure such as the independ-
ent agency is (or should be) constitutional.
The act of interpretation is not mechanical, and reasonable peo-
ple may disagree about which principles, and what wise application
of them for our times, should emerge from the Framers' example.
We should welcome, not despair of, such debates. They are the
source from which a collective wisdom about issues of governmental
structure grows.
The saddest casualty of the literalism that now pervades our sepa-
ration of powers jurisprudence is that literalism cuts short discus-
sion and thought. Lawyers and judges rarely think or talk today
about how government works, or what history teaches are the char-
acteristic flaws in particular governmental designs, and how these
weaknesses may be overcome through creatively designing and
combining institutions. It was just these types of questions that the
Framers asked themselves when they met together in the summer of
1787 in Philadelphia. Perhaps the Framers' answers on questions of
governmental structure were so wise not because their generation
was inherently smarter than ours, but because they asked the right
questions, questions that we no longer dare to ask.
Perhaps we pay homage to the Framers in the wrong way when we
apply their words literally rather than follow their example. Perhaps
we need to think of our separation of powers jurisprudence as a con-
tinuation of the creative discussions about governmental structure
that began at Philadelphia. This we cannot do, however, so long as
we insist on applying the Framers' words but neglecting their
meaning.
81. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
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